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Introduction
Any question of philosophy, […] which is so obscure and uncertain, 
that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard 
to it—if it should be treated at all—seems to lead us naturally into 
the style of dialogue and conversation. 
—Pamphilus to Hermippus, from David Hume’s, 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Theoretical physicists take seriously the idea of time travel; some, 
including J. Richard Gott and Paul Davies, have published mon-
ographs, accessible to the layperson, describing the extraordinary 
work that has been done. Experimental physicists have on occa-
sion even come face to face with the possibility that time travel 
to the past is real. This book is built on conversations set in 2010 
at the Jefferson National Laboratory where unanticipated data 
led distinguished physicist Dr. Carlene Rufus to investigate a 
hypothesis of backwards time travel. 
The conversations are of philosophical interest. In addition 
to Dr. Rufus, the other participants in the conversations are Tad 
Logan, a graduate student research assistant, and William Esquire, 
a philosophically inclined computer scientist. Their careful, and 
often humorous, thoughts wander from the experimental data, 
to science fiction cinema, and even to thoroughly abstract and 
metaphysical paradoxes about the permanence of the past, the 
privilege of the present, the nature of causation, and what one 
can or cannot do. The question of the possibility of time travel is 
a truly abstract and multifaceted one. So, it should be no surprise 
that philosophy, with its diverse subject matter, speculative 
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powers, and its reverence for logic, so grounded as it is in the 
tension between the familiar and the unfamiliar, should here rear 
its head. Indeed, it is Willie’s philosophical input that shapes 
both the planning and analysis of Dr. Rufus’s experiments.
At the beginning of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
Pamphilus reports to Hermippus of having had the occasion to 
observe the insightful conversations of Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo. 
It is with similar good fortune that the conversations of Dr. Rufus, 
Tad, and Willie can now be made public. Thanks to detailed notes 
and well organized data, one week of our researchers’ scientific 
work and philosophical discussions is readily presentable, with 
tolerable accuracy, in the dialogue format long upheld by Plato, 
Berkeley, Hume and so many others. Enjoy!
1. Monday
It is 2:00 pm. Dr. Rufus and Tad welcome Willie to the control 
room and begin to explain why they have called on his computer 
expertise.
Carlene: Tad, would you mind showing William to the control 
console? Do you go by ‘Bill’?
Willie: ‘Willie’, actually. It looks like you’re running a pretty 
powerful system. You must have two dozen new HP-UXs in here.
Tad: Twenty, actually, with about eighty Motorola VMEs for 
input–output control. Coffee?
Willie: Thanks, but it’s a little late in the day for caffeine.
Tad [pouring another cup]: Suit yourself.
Willie [looking around]: Where does the funding for all this 
equipment come from?
Carlene: The Department of Energy, primarily, but NASA, the 
NSF, and a few research universities are interested in what we’re 
doing. We just might be on to something.
Willie: Something big?
Tad: Yes, well, no … something very, very tiny. We think we’ve 
found a new fundamental particle.
Willie: Wow, really? What is it?
Carlene: We’re trying to isolate the elusive psi-lepton. We’ve 
found something, but we’re not sure whether we’ve found it or 
some unanticipated cousin. The particle we’re observing was 
behaving exactly according to our theory, that is, until recently.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0043.01
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Willie: My particle physics is pretty rusty, but I think I remember 
reading something about the psi-lepton. It seemed like pretty 
speculative stuff, even for the fringes of particle physics.
Carlene: Most of my associates have been quite skeptical, which is 
why we’re taking such care in trying to understand our particle’s 
anomalous behavior.
Willie: What’s anomalous about it?
Carlene: I’ll let Tad fill you in. I have some results to look over 
and some more calculations to do. Tad, would you mind telling 
Willie about our dilemma, and then accessing the accelerator 
program files so he can get to work?
Dr. Rufus returns to her office, leaving Willie with Tad at the 
terminal near the control console.
Tad: Okay, so here’s the story. The process we’re running involves 
the ultra-relativistic collision of a uranium isotope and a heavy 
helium ion. We’ve set up B fields—uh, magnetic fields—to filter 
out every particle predicted to escape the collision except, so we 
expect, the psi-lepton. We have software in place to analyze the 
data from the detection devices, which track position and energy. 
The results were exactly what we were hoping for; it seemed 
undeniable that we’d observed a psi-lepton. Unfortunately, we 
haven’t been able to replicate our results since early last week. 
Since then, although we can create a psi-lepton—again, assuming 
that’s what it is—it vanishes long before our theory predicts.
Willie: So, your particle shows a faster decay rate than it should?
Tad: It’s not that simple; it doesn’t appear to be decay at all. We 
observe a second particle that appears out of nowhere, apparently 
annihilating the psi-lepton.
Willie: Out of nowhere?
Tad [pointing to the monitor]: Here’s the weird data. (See Figure 1.1)
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Fig. 1.1 The Unanticipated Results1
Willie: Tell me what I’m looking at exactly.
Tad: It’s a standard position-versus-time graph that also indicates 
energy levels. The dotted line-segment emerging from the origin 
marks the position of the psi-lepton within the chamber at 
different times. The dotted line that emerges near the top of the 
graph at t=3 marks the position of the unexpected second particle. 
The horizontal dashed line marks the total energy within the 
chamber at the various times. The increase in energy at t=3 results 
from the presence of the second particle. Everything goes just as 
1  To see an animation of any of the Monday illustrations online  
visit www.openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783740376#resources  
or scan the QR code.
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expected from t=0 until t=3, but at t=3 we find the second particle in 
the chamber that appears to collide with the psi-lepton at t=5, after 
which there’s no sign of either one. Trial 15 is our most recent trial.
Willie: But you weren’t getting this result before the middle of last 
week, right?
Tad: That’s right. Before then, we’d run eleven trials, and for 
each of those trials the psi-lepton was all by itself in the chamber 
and decayed at t=7, just as our theory predicts. Then we got four 
straight trials of who-knows-what.
Willie: And that’s why I’m here? To tell you whether there’s a bug 
in the accelerator’s program that’s giving you these strange results?
Tad: You’ve got it. Here are the accelerator program files. By the 
way, are you really a philosopher?
Willie: Well, I have a PhD in philosophy. I loved doing metaphysics, 
epistemology, and the like, but a full time job was hard to come by.
Tad: I guess you can’t really expect DOE funding for that kind of 
stuff. I’ll let you get to work.
Willie begins to study the programs that run the accelerator. After 
a few hours, he finishes and approaches Dr. Rufus in her office.
Willie [knocking]: May I?
Carlene: Please, come in. Did you find anything?
Willie: I did, actually; there was a glitch. Since I was able to 
bypass the problem using an alternate code, my guess is that some 
kind of hardware problem cropped up last week. The new code 
is functionally equivalent, but the simulations run much more 
smoothly. As far as I can tell, the accelerator should work fine.
Carlene: Excellent, Willie. Now we can see whether we really have 
the psi-lepton. Won’t you stay for our first trial with your code?
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Willie: Thanks, I will.
Dr. Rufus and Willie leave the office and walk back to the control 
console.
Carlene: Tad, Willie thinks we’re ready to go. Would you mind 
readying the accelerator?
Tad sits down at the console, entering the necessary commands.
Tad: All set, Professor. Shall I start it?
Carlene: Please. (See Figure 1.2)
Fig. 1.2 The Anticipated Results
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Tad: Willie, you’ve done it! Professor, the data indicate we had 
a perfectly stable psi-lepton in the chamber, just as our so-called 
speculative theory predicts. It’s the same result we were getting 
before last week.
Carlene [containing excitement]: Thank you, Tad, but don’t 
be hasty. Right now I’m curious about what was happening 
before Willie bypassed that glitch. If the particle really is a psi-
lepton, how can we account for the strange phenomena we were 
observing? Willie, do you know how the glitch was affecting the 
accelerator?
Willie: No, not really. Like I told you before, I suspect that there 
was some kind of hardware problem; something took place in 
the chamber when the program was run with the original code. 
Without pulling apart all of this beautiful equipment, that’s 
about all I can tell you. If it’ll help, though, I could probably 
figure out when the pesky event took place by restoring the 
original code.
Carlene: It’s not much, but every bit of information could be 
useful. Do you mind?
Willie: Not at all. Reinstating the original code should take only 
a second. Then I’ll attach a diagnostic log that will show when 
the glitch kicks in.
Willie sits back down at the terminal and types for a few minutes.
Carlene: Is that it?
Willie: That’s it.
Carlene: Tad, would you mind running the creation process 
again?
Tad: One psi-lepton, coming right up! (See Figure 1.3)
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Fig. 1.3 Backwards Causation?
Carlene: The anomalous particle is back. Once again, it originates 
at t=3 nanoseconds as it did in trials 13, 14, and 15.
Willie [remaining fixated on his terminal]: I know this is going to 
sound strange, but the event seems to take place at about t=5. 
Everything’s normal until then.
Tad: That is strange. If Willie’s right, the glitch didn’t cause the 
second particle to appear. Its origin is still a mystery.
Carlene [tapping her finger on her nose]: Hmm.
Tad: What are you thinking, Professor?
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Carlene: First, since we seem to be in control of this event, 
perhaps we shouldn’t refer to it as a glitch. Second, in contrast 
to what you said, Tad, if the event doesn’t take place, then 
the anomalous particle doesn’t appear. When it takes place, 
however, the particle does appear. Maybe we should refer to 
the event as a trigger—it does, after all, now appear to be the 
cause of the second particle.
Willie: Backwards causation? You’re suggesting that the trigger 
at t=5 causes the origin of the second particle at t=3?
Tad: What?! You’re not serious, Professor.
Carlene: It’s the closest thing to an explanation for the 
appearance of the second particle we’ve come up with so far. 
Why couldn’t it be a case of backwards causation?
Tad: Because that’s wacky! The future can’t cause the present or 
the past. Backwards causation is just the kind of confusing thing 
Hollywood takes up, not serious researchers.
Dr. Rufus raises her eyebrows in mock offense.
Willie: You know, Tad, what Hollywood seems to care about 
more than anything is entertaining and making money, thus 
the glut of paradoxical time-travel films. But serious researchers 
actually study this kind of thing; philosophers think about 
backwards causation and time travel quite a bit. In any case, 
backwards causation is the only real issue with our experiment. 
Carlene, if I’ve got you right, you believe that the trigger causes 
the anomalous particle to appear before the trigger is, well, 
triggered; then the new particle moves off and collides with the 
psi-lepton. No time travel, only backwards causation.
Carlene: It would be imprudent to believe that or anything else 
at this point in our investigation, but I’m considering the idea.
Tad: Time travel or no time travel, it just doesn’t make sense. 
The problems that come up in the time-travel movies aren’t 
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due to their time-travel aspect so much, but from the presence 
of backwards causation. Take Back to the Future, for instance: 
the time controls of the DeLorean are set in 1985, Marty ends 
up back in 1955, and young Biff chases Marty until Biff gets 
covered in manure as a result. The 1985 event caused the 1955 
events. Okay so far, I guess, but say Marty time-travels to the 
past and permanently breaks up his parents’ meeting, which 
he does only temporarily in the movie. If he had done that, he 
wouldn’t exist any longer, but if he didn’t exist, then he would 
never have been able to go back in time to break up his parents’ 
meeting in the first place. It doesn’t take long for things to get 
ridiculous.
Willie: I’ll grant you that many time-travel films are hard to 
make sense of, but that’s because the writers want to entertain. 
The logical absurdities slip in because the writers are more 
worried about dramatic effect and humor. But the problems in 
these films don’t even begin to undermine the actual possibility 
of either time travel or backwards causation. Besides, there are 
other films that are coherent: Terminator, for one.
Carlene: I’m afraid I’m not familiar with that film.
Willie: So, our society of the future is destroyed by cyborgs 
that were created by the company, Skynet. A devastating war 
between the machines and the humans takes place. During 
the war, the technology for a time-travel device is discovered. 
Events unfold, and one man and one terminator cyborg are sent 
backwards in time. The terminator is programmed to kill Sarah 
Connor, the mother of the leader of the human rebels, which 
will in effect prevent her from giving birth to her son.
Carlene: That doesn’t sound like a logical time-travel plot. 
How can the terminator succeed in killing the mother of a 
leader who later exists before she gives birth to him? Killing 
the mother would change the future; her son would never have 
been born and would never have fought the cyborgs, which the 
film evidently tells us he did. There appears to be a dilemma.
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Willie: Well, you’re right that there’s a logical problem, but it’s 
only with the plan. It seems the cyborgs didn’t think it through. 
But what do you expect from cyborgs? The way things actually 
turn out, the terminator they sent wasn’t successful; he didn’t 
kill Sarah Connor. There’s no suggestion that something both 
did and didn’t happen. Sarah lives to give birth to her son, who 
later leads the humans against the cyborgs. It seems to me that as 
long as there’s no hint that at one and the same time something 
both did and didn’t happen, then the plot could be consistent. 
Back to the Future is a fun film, but it’s hard to make sense of it if 
time is one-dimensional.
Tad: One-dimensional time? As opposed to what?
Carlene [interrupting]: I’m going to have to cut this off. I want 
to get back to what’s going on with the psi-lepton. Have a 
close look at this printout. Consider the possibility that at t=3 
nanoseconds the second particle decays rather than emerges. 
Maybe t=3 nanoseconds is its instant of termination rather than 
its instant of creation.
Tad: Professor, just think about what you’re suggesting. The 
particle can’t decay then because it keeps going! It exists after 
t=3, until t=5. How can you say it’s decaying at t=3?
Carlene: Hold on, Tad. You shouldn’t be so quick to ignore 
your own thoughts. Didn’t you bring up time travel just a few 
minutes ago?
Tad: You can thank Willie for that.
Willie: Carlene, are you suggesting that the psi-lepton is 
time-traveling?
Carlene: I think it’s a candidate explanation for what we’re 
observing. Wouldn’t you agree, Tad?
Tad: A time-traveling psi-lepton? I really don’t know whether 
that’s worth our time.
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Carlene: Time travel could explain a lot of the data we’ve 
collected. Willie said that the trigger occurs at nearly the exact 
moment the two particles supposedly collide. What if there 
was only one particle? The trigger might cause the psi-lepton to 
reverse its temporal direction rather than directly and over a gap 
of time cause the birth of the second particle at t=3 nanoseconds. 
At t=5 nanoseconds, perhaps the psi-lepton ceases traveling 
from present to future, and begins traveling from present to 
past. What we’ve been thinking of as two particles could be just 
one particle, a psi-lepton traveling forward in time and the same 
psi-lepton traveling backward in time. Its lifespan would end 
when it decays at 3 nanoseconds, 7 angstroms from the origin.
Willie: In what way is that a better explanation than the hypoth-
esis that merely posits backwards causation?
Carlene [holding a new printout]: The graph only shows the 
data for the position and energy levels of the psi-lepton, but 
you can see in these supplementary data tables that in this trial 
the mass–energy, momentum, charge, spin—you name it—all 
have the predicted values. The data also indicate that there was 
no disturbance in the chamber’s magnetic field anywhere near 
the supposed collision. If there had been a collision, then there 
should be some recorded disturbance in the chamber’s magnetic 
field at t=5 nanoseconds.
Willie: I see; if the trigger caused the particle to turn around 
in time, to the effect that there was no collision, then we would 
have an explanation for the lack of magnetic field disturbance 
and for the origin of the second trace. We also don’t need to 
posit any mysterious action at a distance between the trigger’s 
occurrence at t=5 and a second particle at t=3. Wow, we might 
have just witnessed a case of actual backwards time travel!
Tad: Come off it, Willie! That doesn’t mean anything. Terminator 
notwithstanding, time travel is a fantasy. It would generate all 
these crazy, impossible situations. I could go back in time and 
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shoot my grandfather, but then if I had shot my grandfather, 
I wouldn’t exist because my grandfather would never have 
fathered my father, and my father would never have fathered 
me. But then you’d have my grandfather lying dead in the 
street back in 1930, shot dead by a killer who never existed. 
Impossible!
Carlene: Tad, how do you propose to explain the fact that the 
trigger seems to cause the anomalous particle to appear as well 
as there being no magnetic field disturbance after the supposed 
collision?
Tad: I don’t know yet. Perhaps it’s just a wild coincidence. 
Besides, you know those B fields can be pretty dicey sometimes.
Carlene: Not just one wild coincidence, Tad, lots of them. 
We’ve run this experiment four times in the last few days and 
every time—excluding the time we ran it with the alternate code 
today—the so-called second particle has appeared.
Willie: Yeah, if we were always content to dismiss anomalies as 
coincidences, then I don’t see how anyone could make progress 
in science. At least the time-travel hypothesis appears to explain 
away the coincidences.
Tad: But this is an extraordinary hypothesis, one that has its 
home in science fiction more than it does in actual science, and 
you’re asking us to consider it on the taxpayer’s dime to boot. 
Maybe a big dose of levelheadedness is in order. 
Carlene [sighing]: Look, guys, this talk really won’t get us as far 
as more experiments will. We need to run more tests tomorrow. 
Do you mind returning tomorrow, Willie? We may need you to 
remove and restore the original code a few more times.
Willie: Sure, I don’t have any pressing projects, and I think the 
Department of Energy can afford me for another day.
2. Tuesday
It is 9:00 am. Tad and Willie are in the lab talking over cups of coffee 
when Dr. Rufus arrives. It is obvious that none of the three slept well.
Carlene: Good morning, gentlemen. Would one of you mind 
pouring me a cup? I was up all night thinking of ways to test our 
time-travel hypothesis.
Tad [pouring Dr. Rufus a cup]: That makes three of us, but maybe 
you had better luck than we did. I, for one, couldn’t get over the 
idea that we’re taking time travel seriously.
Carlene: Please try to get used to it and think about ways to test 
our hypothesis. Where’s the printout from yesterday?
Tad hands Dr. Rufus the cup of coffee and the printout of Trial 17.
Fig. 2.1 A Time-Traveling Psi-Lepton?1
1  To see an animation of any of the Tuesday illustrations online  
visit www.openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783740376#resources  
or scan the QR code.
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Tad: Let me get clear on what the hypothesis is exactly. You’re 
claiming that—despite appearances—there’s only one particle 
whose trajectory is plotted here, and that time-travel departure 
occurs at t=5. We’re considering this hypothesis because it explains 
quite a lot; in particular, if true, it would explain both the lack of 
B-field disturbances at t=5 and the origin of what we thought was 
an anomalous second particle.
Carlene: That’s a fair enough account.
Tad: Okay, but I have a question about the supposed explanation 
of the second particle’s origin and decay. Sure, according to the 
hypothesis, its origin is no longer a mystery; we created it when 
we knocked the uranium into the helium; it’s a psi-lepton. But 
we still don’t have an explanation of what’s going on with that 
particle at t=3. That’s what was really bothering us, what was so 
unexpected and left unexplained by the theory. So, like you’re 
suggesting, what if that isn’t the origin of the particle at t=3? 
According to the time-travel hypothesis, it’s the time-reversed 
decay of the particle. Sure, I’ll buy that, too. But I don’t see that 
we have an explanation for why it decays.
Carlene: Excellent, Tad. That’s quite perceptive.
Tad: Yesterday we thought the time-travel hypothesis would 
account for the origin of the anomalous particle. What we’re saying 
is that it doesn’t exactly originate, at least not at t=3. That’s neat, 
but if we’re taking this idea seriously, there’s still something that 
needs to be explained. In your version, Professor, the anomalous 
particle isn’t coming into existence at t=3; it’s decaying. But why 
should it do that?
Carlene: It didn’t occur to me until late last night, but I think 
that the hypothesis predicts the decay, too. Take a look at the 
duration of the lifespan of the particle in Trial 17. It originates 
at t=0, behaves normally until t=5 nanoseconds, and then travels 
backwards in time for two additional nanoseconds; its lifespan 
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until it decays—how long it exists from its perspective—is seven 
nanoseconds.
Tad: And?
Carlene: And of course you know that a duration of seven 
nanoseconds is precisely what our theory predicts for the lifetime 
of a psi-lepton. It’s also how long our normal psi-lepton lasted in 
Trial 16 and some of our earliest trials.
Tad: Huh, that’s clever, but I still don’t know.
Carlene: None of us knows much of anything at this point, I’m 
afraid. We’re doing little more than speculating. What we need is 
more tests.
Willie: Maybe it would help to think about how the time travel 
we’re considering differs from the backwards causation that you 
first proposed, Carlene; there’s a big difference. Yes, the trigger 
seems to have some kind of backwards causal connection with the 
existence of the anomalous particle at t=3. It would be amazing if 
we could confirm even that much. But if the anomalous particle 
is the psi-lepton time-traveling, then the so-called two particles 
that the detector is recording are really one. That’s crucial to 
the time-travel hypothesis; it’s what takes the mysterious origin 
of the anomalous particle out of play. It also has some more 
fantastic-sounding consequences; for example, it implies that the 
psi-lepton is at two different places at the same time.
Tad: You’re the philosopher; you figure it out. It doesn’t seem 
like such a big deal that there’s really only one particle; their 
sameness is easy to swallow. All I know is that there’s no intrinsic 
difference, but they’re elementary particles, so we should expect 
that. And yeah, they’re in different places at the same time. So 
what? It’s the problem of something in the future causing things 
in the past that bothers me. Whether they’re the same particle 
seems trivial by comparison.
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Carlene: Let’s drop the metaphysics for a moment and concentrate 
on what we really know. The path at the bottom part of the printout 
of our second trial from yesterday, Trial 17, is the theoretically 
predicted path of the psi-lepton. At all the relevant points in the 
chamber, it behaves exactly as predicted by my calculations, until 
the unexplained event occurs.
Tad: You mean the collision?
Carlene: I’m not ready to decide whether it is a collision or 
whether it is a reversal in time, at least not yet. The point here is 
that, according to the data, we have a perfectly stable psi-lepton 
right up until the time of the trigger. The path at the top is where 
the confusion is coming from; all the data indicate it’s a psi-lepton.
Willie: Even a perfect match wouldn’t establish the time-travel 
hypothesis, but I’m not sure what would.
Carlene: That’s enough brainstorming for me; we’re not getting 
any closer to trying a new experiment. What we need are some 
ways to manipulate our experimental set-up that might give us 
some more useful data.
Willie gets up and pours himself another cup of coffee.
Willie: Any ideas, Tad?
Tad: Well, like I said before, what was really keeping me up 
last night was the hypothesis that this trigger thing is causing 
the anomalous particle’s presence. More than the very idea of 
the particle time-traveling, it seems weird that the cause of the 
particle’s appearance happens later than the appearance itself.
Willie: Right, that’s the big problem. You can bet that if we could 
find experimental evidence of backwards causation, it would 
send a shockwave through the philosophical world.
Tad: I’m sure. The big question is how to find the evidence.
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Willie: Well, maybe there’s some way to bilk the experiment; 
maybe we can stop the trigger after the second particle appears.
Tad: That might be tough given there are only a couple of 
nanoseconds between the particle’s appearance and when the 
trigger kicks in.
Willie: But it might be feasible. It would take some tricky 
programming to optimize the processor’s resources, and even 
then it would be a close call, but I might be able to.
Tad: What would it show us if you could?
Willie: It seems that even if we had time to stop the trigger, we 
wouldn’t be able to since the effect of the trigger exists before 
the trigger itself happens, at least according to the time-travel 
hypothesis. If we do stop the trigger, we can rule out time travel 
and backwards causation as possible explanations for the second 
particle.
Tad: And if we don’t stop the trigger, at least we’ll have a lot to 
talk about. You’d probably argue that we would even have some 
experimental evidence that backwards causation is happening.
Carlene: I think that would be a great way to proceed. If we 
can stop the trigger from occurring after the second particle 
appears, we’ll have to consider that a strike against the time-travel 
hypothesis.
Willie: I’ll get started on the program. We’ll see how it goes, but 
I should be able to have it ready for trials today.
Carlene: Excellent. Let me know when you’re ready. I’ll be in my 
office.
Dr. Rufus leaves Tad and Willie in the lab.
Tad: It seems to me that we don’t even need today’s experiment 
to disprove the possibility of backwards causation.
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Willie [typing at the console]: How so?
Tad: Well, we already know we can change whether the second 
particle appears and whether the trigger occurs by inserting the 
new code. There’s the practical matter of optimizing the use 
of the computer’s resources to allow us to prevent the trigger 
in the time between the appearance of the second particle and 
the annihilation of both particles, but that’s just a technological 
problem, and you’re probably about to overcome it. Still, even if 
you don’t succeed, we know it’s possible to insert the new code 
some time after the second particle appears. So, assuming that 
backwards causation is at work, we can prevent the cause of the 
second particle’s appearance after it’s already appeared. But we 
shouldn’t be able to do that, thus backwards causation isn’t at 
work.
Willie: So, correct me if I’m wrong, but your argument goes 
something like this: If the trigger at t=5 causes the second particle’s 
appearance at an earlier time, t=3, then it’s possible to prevent the 
second particle’s appearance at t=3 by switching in the new code 
at, say, t=4.
Tad: Right, that’s what I said. We should be able to prevent 
expected effects by preventing expected causes. On Trial 16, the 
new code was in at t=4 and the second particle never appeared at 
t=3. It appears that the new code being in prevented the trigger, 
which apparently prevented the appearance of the particle.
Willie: But there’s more: Setting the technological concerns 
aside, it’s surely possible to switch in the new code at t=4 after 
the particle appears at t=3.
Tad: Correct.
Willie: So, if the trigger at t=5 causes the second particle’s 
appearance at t=3, then it’s possible to prevent the second 
particle’s appearance at t=3 by using the new code at t=4 and it’s 
also possible to switch in the new code at t=4.
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Tad: Still correct, and there’s the problem. In fact, it’s impossible 
to prevent the particle from appearing at t=3 after it’s already 
appeared at t=3. Preventing it would imply it didn’t happen, but 
it would have already happened.
Willie: And, since it’s impossible to prevent the appearance of 
the second particle after it’s appeared, it’s not the case that the 
trigger causes the second particle to appear.
Tad: Precisely. That’s why it is logical to assume that backwards 
causation can’t be the case and that the psi-lepton isn’t time-
traveling. So, what’s the point of the experiment?
Willie: Well, the time-travel hypothesis might be false, but your 
argument doesn’t show that.
Tad: Why not?
Willie: Your reasoning is invalid. I’ll use another example to 
show you what I mean. Just think about this: It’s possible for my 
coffee cup to be full right now, but it’s also possible for it to be 
empty right now. Therefore it’s possible for it to be both full and 
empty right now? That doesn’t work.
Tad: Which is it?
Willie: What?
Tad: Your coffee cup.
Willie: Oh, truthfully? It’s empty.
Tad: So much for your aversion to caffeine from yesterday. I’ll get 
you some more.
Willie hands his cup to Tad, who goes across the lab to get some 
more coffee. Tad returns, handing Willie a full cup.
Willie: Thanks, Tad.
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Tad: Okay, about your coffee example: I have to admit that it is 
impossible for the cup to be both full and not full right now; that 
really is illogical. But doesn’t saying that it’s possible that it’s full 
and not full right now mean the same as saying that it’s possible 
that it’s full right now and possible that it’s not full right now?
Willie: It may be tempting to interpret it that way; that’s why your 
argument may have seemed to refute the hypothesis of backwards 
causation. As you’ve just acknowledged, however, that’s a bad way 
to reason. It’s obviously possible for the cup to be full right now 
and possible for it to be empty right now, but it’s just as obvious 
that it’s impossible for the cup to be both full and empty right now. 
More generally, I’m saying that, from possibly P and possibly Q, it 
doesn’t logically follow that possibly both P and Q.
Tad: It just seems so much simpler regarding the coffee. How 
does all of this apply to the anomalous second particle?
Willie: It does so in just the same way. On the assumption that 
the trigger at t=5 caused the particle to appear at t=3, it was 
possible to prevent the particle’s appearance at t=3 by inserting 
the new code, and it’s also possible to insert the new code at t=4, 
but it doesn’t follow that it’s possible to prevent the particle’s 
appearance once the particle appears. Once it appears it can’t be 
prevented.
Tad: I see. So, you think we need to run the experiment?
Willie: Absolutely, we do. For starters, Dr. Rufus isn’t going 
to pass up the chance for more data, especially not due to a 
philosophical argument—yours or mine. More importantly, we 
really need to see whether the anomalous particle ever exists 
without the trigger.
The three complete their tasks individually. After lunch, they 
reconvene to begin a trial with Willie’s revision to the program.
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Carlene: Gentlemen, we appear to be ready for today’s 
experiment. Willie, you’re sure you have the accelerator program 
set to remove the trigger as soon as it detects the presence of a 
second particle?
Willie: Yeah, I was able to optimize the use of the processor so 
that the removal of the trigger can be accomplished in less time 
than the interval between the appearance of the second particle 
and the annihilation event.
Carlene: Excellent. Shall we continue?
Tad: I’m starting the accelerator now. (See Figure 2.2)
Fig. 2.2 Willie Slips Up
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Dr. Rufus takes the printout of the latest trial and examines it. A 
wave of puzzlement passes over her face.
Carlene: This is really puzzling. These data look something like 
the results when we removed the trigger altogether.
Willie: This is strange; the diagnostic log shows that the trigger 
was indeed removed upon detection of a particle in the chamber.
Tad: Isn’t that just what it was supposed to do?
Willie: Yeah, so why don’t we see evidence of the second particle?
Carlene: Hang on, Willie; you said your program removed the 
trigger as soon as it detected a particle, right?
Willie: That’s right.
Carlene: At what time did that happen?
Willie [checking the diagnostic log]: The program removed the 
trigger at t=0.1 plus or minus 0.05 nanoseconds.
Carlene: Hmm, just moments after the datum showing the 
creation of the psi-lepton.
Willie [looking embarrassed]: Um, I think I know what happened. 
When I rewrote the program, I set it to switch the trigger off when 
it detected any particle in the chamber, so when the psi-lepton 
showed up, the computer removed the trigger. We effectively 
repeated our Trial 16 from yesterday with no trigger at all. How 
stupid of me.
Carlene: That would certainly explain these results, but it doesn’t 
bring us much closer to establishing or falsifying our time-travel 
hypothesis.
Tad: Do you think you can modify the program so that it won’t 
remove the trigger until after the anomalous particle appears?
Willie: Yes, I can do it, but it’s going to take a little while; I don’t 
want to blow it again. I’ll need to make the program sensitive to 
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the total energy in the chamber and set the threshold high enough 
to prevent the premature removal of the trigger.
Carlene: Here’s what we can do: one of our sponsors is hosting 
a conference tomorrow. Tad and I are planning to attend, so we 
won’t perform any trials. There’s also a conference luncheon. 
Willie, would you care to join us for that? It’ll give us a chance 
to touch base and be ready for the following day. I can arrange a 
place for you.
Willie: That sounds good to me.
Tad: It’s fine with me, too.
Carlene: Excellent. It’s been a long day already, so let’s shut 
everything down. We won’t be running any experiments until at 
least the day after tomorrow.
The three proceed to shut down the equipment in the lab. It does 
not take long for Tad to raise a question.
Tad: You know… I’m still having problems with the whole time-
travel idea. Despite the evidence and the philosophy, I can’t help 
feeling that this whole thing is foolish. It just isn’t possible; you 
can’t change the past; you can’t time travel.
Carlene: I agree that we can’t change the past, but I fail to see 
how that makes time travel impossible.
Tad: It seems obvious to me. If you time-travel, you change the 
past; but since it’s not possible to change the past, you can’t time-
travel. That seems like straightforward logic to me.
Carlene: And how could a time traveler change the past?
Tad: Well, lots of ways. In fact, I don’t see how one can possibly 
avoid changing history when traveling to the past. What if I really 
didn’t like my grandfather? I wish I could have killed him, but he 
died before I had the chance, so I decide to go back in time to kill 
him before he even met my grandmother. Now, I only get one 
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shot at going back in time; I want to make sure I can kill him, so I 
take all the latest weaponry with me.
Willie: Uh oh, this is sounding familiar. Keep going, Tad.
Tad: Since I have the best available arsenal, along with prior 
knowledge of my grandfather’s whereabouts, it seems obvious 
that I can kill him.
Carlene: Well, maybe you slip on a banana peel, or something 
else random like that happens? It would be a little like there being 
the misstep in Willie’s program.
Willie: Thanks for the reminder.
Carlene: Sorry, Willie.
Tad: Look, it doesn’t even have to be anything as dramatic as 
killing my grandfather. I could step on a beetle or crush a blade 
of grass. Even my presence could slightly alter the flow of air. To 
me it seems impossible that I could time-travel to the past without 
altering the past. If nothing else, my tiny mass would slightly 
perturb aspects of the space-time continuum, resulting in some 
sort of change in the world. Since it’s impossible to change the 
past, it seems that I can’t possibly time-travel, and neither can 
our psi-lepton.
Willie: Tad, you’re saying that you could kill your grandfather 
because you have what it takes to do so, but that you can’t kill 
him because doing so would change the past. And you claim that 
this apparent contradiction rules out the possibility of time travel.
Tad: Yeah, absolutely.
Willie: Okay, but let’s take another example. Let’s say that I’m 
carrying a lot of groceries home, and I come up to the door, and 
I say, “Would you mind helping? I can’t open the door”. On the 
one hand, it seems that I said something true. On the other hand, 
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it seems that I very well could have opened the door because I’ve 
done it hundreds of times.
Tad: How is that at all like my example?
Carlene: I think I see how they’re similar. Willie can’t get through 
the closed door while carrying a full load of groceries, but he 
can get through the door when he isn’t so burdened. He also 
could if he had longer arms, or if he had superpowers. In your 
example, Tad, we might have said it was possible for you to kill 
your grandfather if we hadn’t taken into account the fact that he 
died of some other cause at a later time, that he fathered your 
father, and all that. But relative to all those things we do take into 
account about the case, no, you can’t.
Tad: It seems to me that you’re using some weird definition of 
‘can’. I just mean plain old ‘can’, as in ‘possible’.
Willie: Dr. Rufus is right. When you say, “X can’t happen”, you 
normally don’t mean that there’s absolutely no logically possible 
way that X happens; there are even possibilities where the laws 
of physics are different. If ‘can’t’ were to rule out all possibilities, 
we’d almost never use it. How ‘X can’t happen’ actually seems 
to work is to indicate that there’s no possible way that X occurs 
while other pertinent facts hold. What these facts are depends on 
the features of the conversation.
Tad: Okay, so what if ‘can’t’ means there’s no possibility of the 
event occurring while certain other facts hold? If I travel to the 
past, I still both can and can’t kill my grandfather.
Willie: I don’t think so. Either you can or you can’t, but which 
one it is depends on what facts are taken as given. You can kill 
your grandfather given just the fact that you’re well-armed, but 
not given the facts about how he actually died, say, of old age. 
You obviously can’t kill him, given the fact that you didn’t kill 
him. It doesn’t really matter that you—his grandson—are the one 
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trying to kill him; the same applies to anyone trying to kill your 
grandfather at a time he wasn’t killed. Your scenario doesn’t give 
rise to a contradiction. It would be a problem only if you both can 
and can’t kill him given the same facts, but that’s not the case.
Tad: But when I step out of my time machine and bend that blade 
of grass, I’ve changed the past!
Carlene: I disagree. You caused the blade of grass to be bent, but 
that’s not changing the past unless that blade of grass wasn’t bent 
at that time in the past.
Willie: And it was bent if your story is going to be consistent. 
Don’t try to tell us that it was as straight as an arrow at that time 
the first time, but was bent the second time around. That really 
is a contradictory story, but there’s no reason to think that time 
travel is like that. If that blade of grass was bent at that time, then 
it was always bent at that time.
Tad: Well, if we can’t change the past, what were those cyborgs 
thinking in Terminator—the movie you think is consistent—when 
they sent a terminator back in time to kill Sarah Connor?
Willie: That’s one thing I didn’t like about the film. There’s no 
contradiction, but the cyborgs did reason poorly in thinking 
that they could prevent something they knew to have happened. 
But like I said yesterday, what do you expect from cyborgs? It’s 
unfortunate that this provides the basic premise for the rest of the 
story. It’s a rare time-travel film that acknowledges our inability 
to change the past, though there is the sci-fi gem, 12 Monkeys.
Tad: What happens?
Willie: A man, James Cole, travels back in time. He’s sent from 
2035 to determine the origins of a deadly virus that plagued 
humanity in 1996, which drove the survivors underground. His 
goal is to take a sample of the pure virus to the future, to study 
and hopefully to discover a vaccine.
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Tad: But if the vaccine is discovered, then the deaths of 1996 could 
be prevented after they occur, which leads to a contradiction.
Willie [interrupting]: Hold on, that’s not what he was up to. The 
scientists knew they couldn’t save the lives of those who were 
already dead; they wanted only to make a vaccine to prevent 
further deaths and to allow people to re-inhabit the surface of the 
Earth.
Tad: Okay, that makes enough sense, but it’s starting to sound 
like I would have to step on that blade of grass as I step out of the 
time machine, which is too crazy even to consider.
Willie: Why is it so crazy?
Tad: Presumably there’s nothing to grab my foot and push it 
down on that blade of grass; nothing would be forcing me to step 
on it. How can it be true that I would have to step on that blade 
of grass? If it had to be bent, it’s not even clear how I could have 
caused it to be bent. It sounds like it would have to be bent no 
matter what I did.
Willie: The language is tricky here. When we say, “It would have 
to be bent” or “You would have to step on it”, we’re taking for 
granted that you did step on it. We’re saying something pretty 
trivial, actually: given that you stepped on it, you have to step on 
it. We may as well say that, given the grass gets bent, the grass 
must get bent. These are really trivial claims.
Tad: But I wouldn’t have to! No one would be forcing me!
Willie: Forget about the time travel for a second. Given that 
you will wash your coffee cup later, you have to wash it. There’s 
nothing mysterious about that. It doesn’t imply the existence of 
manipulative forces; it’s just what you will do. And it’s the same 
in the time-travel case: given that you stepped on that grass, you 
will have to step on it.
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Tad: But I could decide to hop out of the time machine, rather 
than step down, and miss that blade of grass completely.
Willie: Well, maybe you could.
Carlene: Wait a moment, Willie. Now it sounds like you are 
contradicting yourself. Which is it? Could he have hopped over 
the blade of grass or not?
Willie: Like I said, it’s tricky. Don’t forget about my trouble 
carrying the groceries. Could I have opened that door or not? It’s 
a simple question to answer when it’s clear what’s being taken 
for granted. I surely said something true when I said, “I can’t 
open the door”, but there are other contexts where it’s not taken 
for granted that I’m carrying a heavy, awkward load of groceries. 
Relative to these contexts, it’s true to say, “Willie can open the 
door”. After all, I would’ve needed nothing more than slightly 
longer arms, a tad—pardon the pun—more upper-body strength, 
or to be able to set down the groceries. Using ‘could’ in place of 
‘can’ politely suggests that a change of the context is needed, that 
we should bring into play some more remote possibilities.
Tad: I’ll just politely ignore your pun.
Willie: Look, Carlene, you asked whether Tad could have 
hopped out of the machine. Sure, he could have, but can he? This 
is a hard question to answer when it’s not clear what’s being 
taken for granted. If we suppose that Tad stepped on that grass 
however many years ago, that he stepped down from and didn’t 
hop out of the time machine, then obviously he must step down. 
When he’s faced with exiting the time machine, he can’t hop out. 
If we don’t suppose that Tad stepped onto the grass, however, if 
all we suppose is that Tad has the normal allotment of human 
capabilities, that there’s nothing coercing him to do anything, 
and we also have no idea how things went, then he can exit the 
time machine in all kinds of ways. He may even decide the past 
looks scary and never leave the time machine.
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Tad: Now it’s starting to sound like there’s no fact of the matter 
about what I’m able to do.
Willie: That isn’t what I’m saying at all.
Tad [interrupting]: Hold it, Willie, don’t say a thing. I’m too tired to 
keep this up. You haven’t convinced me, but my head is starting to 
hurt. Professor, are we done here? If so, I’m heading home.




The three are seated at a table. The speaker, Dr. Twitchell, has just 
concluded a talk about the expanding universe. Lunch is being 
served.
Carlene: It looks like we’ll be gathering a lot more data about our 
mystery particle in the coming weeks. I might even say I hope it’s 
time-traveling.
Willie: I’m still thinking about Dr. Twitchell’s talk; it’s always 
struck me as odd to describe the universe as expanding. What’s 
it expanding into?
Dr. Rufus and Tad share skeptical glances.
Tad: I don’t know about that, Willie, but something similar 
has been bothering me about our time-travel hypothesis. I’m 
wondering where the particle could go.
Carlene: I don’t understand.
Tad: If the psi-lepton reverses its direction in time, traveling from 
the present to the past, then we should acknowledge that the past 
exists, but that’s not right. I mean, whatever happened yesterday, 
or even a moment ago, is done; it happened in another time, and 
that time no longer exists. This is now; the past—and the future, 
for that matter—don’t exist. How can the psi-lepton time-travel if 
there’s nowhere for it to go?
Dr. Rufus looks interested, but Willie is unimpressed.
Willie: That sounds like some arguments against time travel that 
I’ve heard from proponents of presentism.
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Tad: And what’s presentism?
Willie: Well, although it’s defined somewhat differently by 
different philosophers, presentism is generally taken to hold that 
only what is present exists.
Tad: Okay, good, that seems pretty obvious to me. But I get the 
feeling there isn’t general agreement that that’s the way the world 
works.
Willie: Perceptive as always, Tad. Many philosophers believe 
in some form of eternalism, which contradicts presentism in 
holding that some non-present things exist. Eternalists believe 
that, in addition to what is present, both what is future and what 
is past exists.
Tad: So, you’re saying that a presentist would claim that Albert 
Einstein doesn’t exist, which is obvious, but that an eternalist 
would say he does exist?
Willie: Yeah, but the eternalist would concede that Einstein 
doesn’t exist now.
Tad: That doesn’t make any sense to me. How can you claim that 
something exists but doesn’t exist now?
Willie: Well, I’m not claiming that, but the eternalist would just 
be saying that Einstein exists in the past but not in the present.
The server arrives with three lunches.
Carlene: It actually seems obvious to me that Einstein exists, not 
now, but in 1905, for instance. We’re talking about him, aren’t 
we? Willie, I guess you would classify me as an eternalist. But I’m 
wondering, wouldn’t the presentist admit that as well? Wouldn’t 
he concede that, though Albert Einstein doesn’t exist now, he 
does in 1905?
Willie: Well, strictly speaking, no. You have, however, come 
upon a key difference between presentism and eternalism: the 
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eternalist might say that Einstein exists some years ago, but the 
presentist would say only that he existed some years ago.
Carlene: That seems to be nothing more than word play.
Willie: In a way, it might be. I’m not entirely sure myself.
Tad: But what about my objection to our particle’s being a time 
traveler?
Willie: There’s a lot to be said. Let’s make sure we have the 
argument right. You claim that if there’s only the present, and if 
time travel requires a destination other than the present to travel 
to, then there’s nowhere for a time traveler to go—better yet, no 
when for the time traveler to go.
Tad: Once again, Willie, you know exactly what I said.
Willie: Good. It seems to me that we have a few relevant options: 
we can give up our time-travel hypothesis while granting that the 
argument is sound, or we can give up presentism—there’s still 
eternalism, after all—or we could hang on to both time travel and 
presentism and then try to uncover some flaw in the argument 
that doesn’t demand that we reject presentism.
Tad: The argument seems foolproof to me, including the 
assumption that presentism is true. I lean towards giving up the 
time-travel hypothesis.
Willie: We know that’s how you see it, Tad, but we might as well 
give it some more thought.
Carlene: As tempted as I am to outright reject presentism, I 
suspect there’s something wrong with Tad’s argument. Sorry, 
Tad. It appears that if Tad’s argument works—if it’s sound, as 
you philosophers say, Willie—then all forms of time travel 
must be impossible. I doubt that presentism has such a strong 
consequence.
Tad: I think it does have such a consequence. Neither the future 
nor the past exists if only the present does. Any form of time 
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travel requires the existence of a time other than the present, so if 
only the present exists, then any form of time travel is impossible.
Carlene: Tad, think about the special theory of relativity, though; 
it tells us that at least a certain kind of forward time travel is 
possible. Time passes differently for material objects that take 
different paths through space and time; for example, a twin who 
makes a roundtrip at nearly the speed of light to a distant location 
ages much less than his twin who never leaves Earth. We actually 
know that this kind of time travel takes place; in one experiment, 
two atomic clocks—one placed on a plane and flown around for 
a few hours, and the other left on Earth—experience different 
amounts of time. The ability of atmospheric muons to reach the 
ground, the phenomenon of Thomas precession, and even the 
quantum-relativistic effects that give us the glitter of gold are all 
examples of well-understood physical phenomenon that involve 
this kind of time dilation. The important point, though, is that it 
seems that at least one form of time travel is very real.
Willie [looking back at Tad]: A hypothetical case makes the same 
point. If a woman were cryonically suspended for ten years before 
being revived, she would experience something like forward time 
travel. She might be convinced that it’s 2010 when it’s really 2020; 
she would be able to describe nothing about her trip but would 
have excellent recall of events immediately prior to suspension. 
That seems perfectly possible and like a case of time travel, so 
something must be wrong with your argument.
Tad: Seriously? That’s not time travel!
Willie: Why not?
Tad: I’m not exactly sure. Even the atomic clock traveling at high 
speeds seems a little too mundane to be time travel, but I’ll grant 
you that case, Professor. The deep freeze is a different matter.
Carlene: I agree with Tad about the cryonic process. In terms 
of the physics, there’s nothing interesting going on temporally. 
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The Northern wood frog, a species that regularly freezes solid 
during the winter, is not a species of time-traveling amphibian; 
there are intra-cellular and sub-molecular processes taking place 
even though little or nothing is happening at macroscopic levels.
Willie: Fine, but whether freezing and thawing is a way to 
time-travel is irrelevant. All I said, by the way, is that it was like 
a case of time travel. The point I want to make is that what’s 
important about traveling is not that the destination be there 
when the traveler starts out, but that it be there when the traveler 
arrives. It doesn’t matter whether the year 2020 exists when our 
woman is frozen, so long as it exists when she thaws. Similarly, 
it doesn’t seem important that the arrival time as experienced by 
the clock on Earth exists when the plane starts to accelerate, but 
it’s important that the arrival time exists when the plane returns. 
Tad’s argument seems to overlook this particularly salient detail.
Tad: I don’t follow.
Willie: Suppose you just graduated from high school. You and 
some friends have heard of an amazing theme park that’s being 
built in Zimbabwe, so you decide to go there for an extended 
graduation trip, figuring that if you start walking when they 
hand you your diplomas, you’ll get to the park just when it opens.
Tad: Okay, that’s a pretty crazy story, but I’ll play along. I guess 
my friends and I will need to do some swimming during the 
journey, too.
Willie: Good point. So, with your first step, and eventually your 
first backstroke across the Atlantic, you’re traveling to the theme 
park, right?
Tad: Sure.
Willie: Well, the theme park doesn’t exist yet, so you’re traveling 
to a place that doesn’t exist. If that’s the case, then one of your 
premises is false, and your argument is unsound.
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Carlene [smiling]: Just a minute, Willie, I think you’re trying to 
trick Tad. Perhaps the theme park in Zimbabwe doesn’t exist yet, 
but the space where it will be exists, so Tad and his friends aren’t 
really traveling to a place that doesn’t exist.
Willie: Okay, okay, I’ll concede that my example has that flaw, 
but—with Dr. Twitchell’s talk in mind—we might suppose that 
our universe expands by creating new spatial locations; then you 
could take a trip to a place that doesn’t exist. Of course, by the 
time you get there, it’ll exist.
Tad: I still don’t follow. If yesterday doesn’t exist, then I can’t 
travel there; if tomorrow doesn’t exist, then I can’t travel there. 
It would be like meeting Godzilla or traveling to the Fountain of 
Youth; it can’t be done.
Willie: The difference is that the future will exist, and the past 
did exist. Godzilla and the Fountain of Youth never existed, don’t 
exist now, and never will exist. You can be traveling to a spatial 
or temporal destination that doesn’t exist yet; you just can’t 
arrive until it does. When you’re traveling to some time or place, 
you’re engaging in traveling behavior, but you don’t need to be 
simultaneously arriving anywhere.
Carlene: Is that true, Willie? In the expanding-universe example, 
even if I want to travel to a region of space that doesn’t exist yet, 
on the way there I would have to travel through—or arrive at—
all the intervening space that does exist; the intervening space is 
what seems to make the trip possible. The analogy doesn’t appear 
to hold up; if presentism is true, if the present is all there is, then 
there’s no intervening time through which to travel.
Willie: But in a presentist’s universe all of the intervening times 
will at some point be present.
Carlene: That’s not really the issue, is it? It seems that in order to 
travel to some place, we must travel through all the intervening 
locations; in space, these are readily available, but in a presentist 
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universe there’s only the present. Maybe we could, in manner of 
speaking, ride the present until a later time exists, but is that time 
travel? In the same way that the wood frog isn’t time-traveling 
while it’s frozen, the normal passage of time isn’t time travel.
Willie: I would say that the normal passage of time is a form of 
time travel—albeit a limiting case of it—but you’re right that we 
don’t go out of our way to think of it like that. More has to be 
going on than just riding the present for an interesting case of 
time travel. 
Tad [interrupting]: Professor, Willie admitted you were right!
Carlene: I don’t think Willie was finished, Tad.
Willie: I was going to point again to the twin-paradox case. The 
traveling twin occupies intervening positions in space and time 
on his way away from and on his way back to Earth, but what 
makes it time travel—genuinely interesting time travel—is how 
so much less time passes for him than for his stay-at-home twin 
and everyone else on Earth. 
Tad quiets down. The server arrives, clearing the table and offering 
coffee. The offer is eagerly accepted.
Tad [returning to business]: I still think time travel is incompatible 
with presentism; actual time travel would require arriving at 
some non-present time, which presentists deny exists.
Willie: Look, how about this. A time traveler enters a time 
machine now and will arrive in 2020. The presentist should be 
fine with that.
Tad: There’s still something screwy. This ‘will arrive’ thing 
bothers me. Until your time traveler arrives in 2020, it isn’t true 
that she arrives at that destination. So, how can anyone now be 
time-traveling?
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Willie: Sometimes our present-tense statements require for 
their truth what will or did occur to happen in a certain way. 
If our waiter is now placing arsenic in your coffee, isn’t he now 
committing a murder, even though for that to be true it must also 
be true that, not knowing any better, you will drink the coffee 
and die? To be time-traveling now, you must be engaging in 
some sort of traveling behavior that causes that you did arrive or 
that you will arrive. 
The coffee is delivered. Tad scrutinizes the contents of his cup.
Tad: Now it sounds like you’re saying that being a time traveler 
doesn’t really require that the past or future exist. It seems that all 
it requires is engaging in a certain behavior like traveling at high 
speeds or pulling the lever on a time machine. I have to admit that 
this sounds pretty reasonable. Traveling to ancient Greece implies 
that ancient Greece exists, but the presentist definitely denies that 
ancient Greece exists. Traveling at high speeds? Pulling a lever? 
These things seem perfectly consistent with presentism.
Willie: Then, maybe, we’re in more agreement than I first 
thought. I was thinking of time-traveling to the past as consistent 
with presentism because I understood this as requiring only that 
the past did exist. You say that it also requires that the past exists 
and so see traveling to the past as inconsistent with presentism. 
Yet we can agree that I can be time-traveling even if presentism 
is true just by seeing time-traveling as a matter of engaging in 
the right kind of behavior. So, we seem to be in agreement on the 
important point that time-traveling is consistent with presentism.
Tad: So it seems.
Carlene: Setting aside my worry from before, Willie, it might be 
helpful if you could tell us how some time-travel example fits 
with presentism.
Willie: Well, if one of you will outline one of your favorite time-
travel plots, I’ll show you how the same story can be told in a way 
that’s consistent with presentism.
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Tad: Okay, how about Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home. Kirk and the 
Enterprise crew travel back to twentieth century Earth, interact 
with some nobodies like us, find two humpback whales, and 
then take those whales back to the twenty-third century to stop 
an alien probe from destroying Earth.
Willie: Sure, I don’t remember any obvious contradictions in 
that one. And remember, we said that presentists don’t deny 
past- and future-tensed truths. So, suppose it’s two days after the 
Enterprise crew picked up the whales sometime in the 1980s. At 
that time it would be true to say that there was a ship that picked 
up two whales two days ago, and in 300 some years that ship will 
appear near Earth.
Carlene [interrupting]: I get the point. All you have to do is 
express the elements of the story in different tenses to make it 
fit with presentism. I’m still not convinced this isn’t just a way of 
playing with the language.
Tad: Hang on, Professor, I just thought of something. Maybe the 
part of my objection about not having anywhere to go is dead, 
but I still think there’s disagreement between presentism and 
the time-travel hypothesis. Willie, what about the causation our 
particle must be involved in if it’s time-traveling?
Willie: I admit that there must be some strange causation; no 
matter which view—presentism or eternalism—is correct, 
backwards causation is troubling. But I don’t think the type of 
causation we’re worried about here raises any special issues for 
presentism.
Carlene: Surely, though, if only the present exists, causation 
must occur only in the present.
Willie: Be careful to remember that causation isn’t an event; 
it’s a relation between events. Even though we sometimes talk 
about causation as if it’s the kind of thing that happens in time, it 
doesn’t actually. More importantly, there are countless apparent 
examples of causal relationships between present and non-present 
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things; for example, the Big Bang caused the Earth, like every 
other material thing, to exist. Many of the things we do today 
will have effects in the future. If presentism is true, then it has to 
be able to explain how there could be any causal relationships at 
all, which is something presentism has to do whether or not time 
travel is possible.
Tad: Okay, so the apparent discrepancy between presentism and 
causation isn’t limited to issues of time travel, meaning that the 
issue about causation doesn’t really help us determine whether 
time travel and presentism are compatible.
The server returns and refills Willie’s empty cup. Willie offers the 
server a thumbs up.
Carlene: The thing that most worries me about presentism is 
scientific in nature, but we don’t need to get into that right now.
Willie: No, go ahead, I’m curious.
Carlene: Okay, so what worries me is that presentism seems 
to presume an absolute frame of reference that distinguishes 
what’s real from what isn’t; the present seems to consist of all 
and only those events simultaneous with right now. This is quite 
a departure from Einstein’s relativity. The hallmark of relativity 
is that it doesn’t include any notion of absolute simultaneity; 
simultaneity is a frame-dependent notion. If this is right, then 
presentism has to be false.
Willie: Yeah, that does seem to be a blow with respect to the truth 
of presentism, and—as I may have demonstrated earlier—I’m not 
exactly prepared to defend presentism until its dying day. This 
issue isn’t really a problem distinctive of presentism, though; lots 
of our ordinary ways of thinking about time, space, and motion 
look to be at odds with relativity. Just as these ordinary ways 
of thinking have to be reconsidered in light of relativity, maybe 
elements of presentism need to be reconsidered too. Just as I’m 
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not ready to say there’s no such thing as motion and length, I’m 
not ready to conclude, well, that there’s no time like the present.
The three share a chuckle.
Tad: Good one, Willie.
Willie: Just to be clear, even though I said “no time like the 
present”, what I mean is that I’m not ready to conclude that times 
other than the present actually exist.
Tad [interrupting]: Lighten up, Willie. It was amusing; we get it.
Carlene: Once again, this philosophical discussion is well 
and good, but if it is possible that the particle is time-traveling 
backwards in time, then it’s up to science to show whether it’s 
actually doing so. So, let’s table the discussions for a while, until 
we have some more data to back up our ideas. With any luck—




It is 7:00 am. Dr. Rufus and Willie are sitting at the computer 
console with cups of coffee, talking. Tad enters.
Tad: Wow, I thought that I was getting an early start!
Carlene [looking up]: Oh, Tad, I didn’t hear you come in; we’re 
having an absolutely stimulating conversation.
Tad [yawning]: I think I need to have some stimulating caffeine 
before I can have any stimulating conversation.
Willie: Sorry, Tad.
Tad [seeing empty coffee pot]: Hey, don’t you know that the first 
one in is supposed to make the coffee?
Willie: I do, and I did.
Tad looks from the empty coffee pot to Willie, who holds up his 
cup and tips it upside down to make the point.
Willie: It was good to the last drop.
Tad: Uh oh, what does that much caffeine do to a philosopher?
Willie: Hey, if the Department of Energy wants this work done, 
they’ll have to lend me some of their energy. You can make the 
next pot; I think I saw some decaf in the cabinet.
Tad [mocking horror]: Decaf?!
Carlene: Settle down, Tad. Willie’s just teasing.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0043.04
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Tad [recuperating]: So, is that the program that turns off the trigger 
when two particles appear in the chamber?
Carlene: No, it isn’t. Willie’s been trying to sell me on some 
new ideas for variations on the experiment.
Willie: After lunch yesterday, while you two attended the rest 
of the conference, I wrote the program that deactivates the 
trigger when two particles are present. I also wrote a program 
that is, in a way, the opposite; instead of turning the trigger off 
when the second psi-lepton appears, this program doesn’t turn 
the trigger on until the second one appears. It’s loaded right 
now.
Tad: Wait, tell me whether I have this straight. The trigger is 
initially off, but if two particles appear in the chamber, the 
program will turn the trigger on?
Willie: Now you are the master of summary.
Tad: Sure, Willie. But why are we bothering to run this program 
at all? I think it’s obvious what will happen: regardless of 
whether the time-travel hypothesis is correct, if the trigger is 
turned off, then it’ll look exactly like the trial without the trigger 
that we ran on Monday, Trial 16; the psi-lepton will live its life 
and decay normally.
Carlene: Maybe, maybe not. We thought we knew what our 
data would look like the first time we isolated the psi-lepton, 
but we were certainly wrong then. In order to approach this 
problem scientifically, we need hard data, not speculation. Our 
knowledge of the psi-lepton’s behavior is based almost entirely 
on our theory, and this trigger throws another unpredictable 
factor into the equation. I really don’t think we can assume 
anything at this point.
Tad: What else could happen?
Willie [pressing a few keys]: Well, let’s find out. (See Figure 4.1)
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Fig. 4.1 A Causal Loop?1
Carlene [smiling]: And that’s why we should never assume that 
we know what the outcome of an experiment will be.
Tad grabs a printout of Trial 19.
Tad: How is this possible? These results look just like the other 
trials in which the trigger was turned on.
Carlene: So, the so-called second particle, the time-traveling psi-
lepton, turned on the trigger that caused the time travel.
1  To see an animation of any of the Thursday illustrations online  
visit www.openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783740376#resources  
or scan the QR code.
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Tad: That shouldn’t have happened even if the time-travel 
hypothesis is true. When the program was started, there was no 
trigger, and no trigger means no particle. Therefore, unless this 
just happened to be the one in eight bazillion times that another 
particle spontaneously appeared in the chamber, the experiment 
should have gone just like Trial 16.
Willie: Well, the trigger remaining off would have been consistent 
with our hypothesis; however, I believe that the actual results are 
consistent as well.
Tad: How can you say that? The second particle is clearly present 
in these results! According to your theory, the second particle 
shouldn’t appear unless the trigger causes it, but the trigger was 
turned off in this program, so there was nothing to cause the 
second particle.
Willie: Not so fast, consider this: the anomalous second particle 
appeared, causing the program to activate the trigger; the trigger 
then caused the psi-lepton to change its temporal direction, thus 
traveling to the earlier time. The graph would look just like it 
does on the printout you’re holding.
Tad: But there was nothing to cause the time travel.
Willie: Yes, there was; the trigger caused it.
Tad: But the trigger was turned off.
Willie: The trigger was initially turned off, but the presence of the 
time-reversed psi-lepton in the chamber turned it on.
Tad: But the particle shouldn’t have been there!
Willie: But it was.
Tad [containing frustration]: But there was nothing to cause it to be 
there.
Willie: The trigger caused it.
Carlene [interrupting]: Guys, you’re going around in circles.
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Willie: What a fortunate phrase! Yes, we’re talking about the 
possibility of a causal loop here, wherein each event is among its 
own causes.
Tad: A causal loop? Oh please. What could have caused the loop 
itself? There’s no reason that we should have a particle–trigger 
loop rather than no loop at all.
Willie: There seem to be a lot of possible causes; for example, by 
starting the accelerator, we could have caused the loop.
Tad: Wait, no, that can’t be right. As we’ve already seen, lots of 
things could have happened after we started the accelerator; we 
got different results in the past. Starting the accelerator wasn’t 
enough to guarantee that the loop occurred—assuming there’s a 
loop at all—so how could it have been the cause?
Carlene: Well, if we hadn’t started the accelerator, then the 
causal loop wouldn’t have occurred. Remember yesterday when 
we said that the Big Bang caused everything that’s happened 
since? It’s the same kind of thing; if the Big Bang hadn’t occurred, 
none of the events since would have. But it’s not clear that the Big 
Bang guaranteed any of the particular events that followed any 
more than turning on the accelerator guaranteed the causal loop.
Tad [staring blankly]: Okay, Professor, I see what you’re saying, 
but I’m still not sure how some event could be the cause of 
another if it’s possible for the first to occur without the second. 
Here’s what I was getting at. Once the experiment started, there 
must have been some conditions that led to the occurrence of the 
loop rather than the ordinary life and decay of a single psi-lepton.
Willie: Our actual results were just one way that this could have 
gone; nothing about our set-up entailed that we would get the 
results that we did, with the trigger, rather than without the trigger.
Tad: Then how do we explain the results we got?
Willie: For starters, not all events are completely determined by 
initial conditions and the laws of nature alone; for example, quantum 
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mechanics, on one standard interpretation, is an indeterministic 
theory. Given the laws of nature and the state of the universe at 
a time, there’s only a certain probability that some possible state 
of the universe will follow, and that probability isn’t 100 percent. 
If this is true—and if all events require an explanation—then we 
need some way of explaining undetermined events.
Tad: Which is?
Carlene: We think about explanation in terms of causes all the 
time, Tad, often like this: some event causes another if and only if 
the effect-event is less likely to occur when the cause-event doesn’t 
occur. During this trial we used Willie’s new program, which 
starts with the trigger off but turns it on whenever two particles 
are detected in the chamber. If we had simply left the trigger off, 
then the causal loop probably—almost certainly—wouldn’t have 
occurred, so it’s reasonable to think that using this program—in 
addition to starting the accelerator, the Big Bang, and so on—
caused the loop to occur. That seems like a pretty good explanation.
Tad: But we started with the trigger off; that’s exactly how we’ve 
started several other trials. There was no difference in the initial 
conditions that led to the occurrence of the loop.
Willie: How can you say that the initial conditions were the 
same? Dr. Rufus just mentioned how the computer was running 
a different program and how that affected the possible outcomes.
Tad: The trigger was turned off initially, so I don’t see how that 
makes any difference. In terms of probability, the chance of a 
second psi-lepton spontaneously appearing in the chamber is on 
the order of—well, the probability is essentially zero. But that’s 
the only way another psi-lepton could have found its way into 
the chamber, and that’s the only way the program could have 
turned the trigger on.
Carlene: Willie, even though you make a plausible case, I have to 
admit to finding the causal-loop idea dubious.
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Willie: Okay, maybe we should consider a different take on our 
results. You both seem to be assuming that every phenomenon in 
our universe admits of an explanation, is caused, and so on.
Carlene: This is the best attitude to take in science.
Willie: Methodologically that may be correct, but theoretically 
that may be a little presumptuous.
Dr. Rufus raises her eyebrows in genuine offense.
Carlene: Tread lightly.
Willie: Look, maybe it’s a causal loop, which itself may be 
inexplicable. The Big Bang might be inexplicable, too, as well as 
why the universe is lawful in the manner that it is. Any event that 
quantum mechanics tells us was extremely improbable may also 
be inexplicable; citing low probabilities hardly explains why the 
improbable event occurred. Our causal loop—if that’s what it is—
is, I think, a good candidate for being an inexplicable sequence 
of events. Would it matter if it were inexplicable? Would you 
really suggest that we ignore the results in front of us because of 
a philosophical position on explanation?
Tad: Do you even know what ‘tread lightly’ means?
Carlene: It’s okay, Tad; Willie has a point. We do have a result 
that we need to contend with, and the best way is to get more 
results.
Willie: I think that part of the problem is that we’re used to 
thinking about causes and effects in a linear fashion. Normally 
causes are independent variables, and effects are dependent 
variables; the causal chain doesn’t usually link up to itself.
The three sit in silence for a bit.
Carlene: So, in our supposed causal loop, every event is both its 
own cause and its own effect.
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Willie: Yeah, I don’t think any event in our loop really fits our 
usual assumptions about cause–effect relationships; I don’t think 
we should try to identify the cause of our loop in terms of the 
ordinary linear relationships we’re used to dealing with.
Tad: Maybe I’m too linear in my thinking. Then again, maybe these 
loops don’t make any sense.
Carlene: Right now I think we ought to try our first idea, the 
program that turns the trigger off when a second particle is detected. 
I believe this trial will really be the one to give clear evidence for 
or against the time-travel hypothesis. We have all the time in the 
world for data analysis and philosophical speculation.
Willie: I’m uploading the first program right now.
Tad: I still don’t think causal loops make any sense. They make all 
sorts of ridiculous situations possible.
Willie: Such as?
Tad: Well, I once saw this movie called Somewhere in Time, but I 
don’t remember much about it.
Carlene: What do you remember?
Tad: I remember that there’s a young man visited by an old lady 
in the 1970s, and she gives him a watch before leaving and saying 
only, “Come back to me”. Many years later, the young man sees 
an old picture in a hotel of a beautiful actress that fascinates him. 
He does some research and finds a picture of that actress as an 
old lady, and he realizes that it’s the same one who’d given him 
the watch. After talking to some weirdo who’d written a book 
about how to time-travel through self-hypnosis, the young man 
goes back in time to 1920. Once there, he finds the young actress, 
and they fall in love. Before returning to the 1970s, the young 
man gives the actress the watch that she will give to him when 
she’s older. And so the history of the watch forms a complete 
loop, which makes no sense.
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Willie: That’s a pretty decent recall, I’d say. But what’s wrong 
with the watch? It sounds to me like it had a completely consistent 
causal history: the man gave it to the actress in 1920; she carried 
it with her until the 1970s at which point she gave it to him; then 
he returned it to 1920 and gave it back to her.
Tad: What’s wrong?! Nobody ever made the watch!
Willie: So?
Tad: So, that’s impossible! Watches don’t just appear out of thin 
air, Willie!
Willie: But it didn’t; the watch’s first appearance in 1920 was 
supposed to be the result of the time travel from the future.
Tad: And, as I’ve said all along, that’s the underlying problem, 
the backwards causation. There’s another problem, too. In order 
for the story to be consistent, the watch would have to be exactly 
the same when the actress first received it and when the man took 
it back in time to give it to her, right?
Willie: Definitely.
Tad: If that’s true, though, then the watch wouldn’t be able to 
age at all. The actress carried it around for fifty years or so; even 
if you assume the watch didn’t rust or get scratched or whatever, 
its entropy would still have increased over that time.
Willie: Then the outside world must have expended energy to 
return the watch to its initial state. All that goes to show is that 
the longer the time between the arrival and the departure of the 
watch, and the larger it is, the more energy that’s required to 
return it to the prior state. This could happen when the watch 
time-travels. Oh, the program is ready to go.
Tad: I still say there’s no need to run this program.
Willie [looking amused]: Are you scared that you’ll be proven 
wrong if we run this trial?
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Tad: No, because there’s no doubt in my mind that I’ll be proven 
right; I’m just trying to save some money for the DOE. If we can 
turn off the trigger after the appearance of the second particle 
that was caused by the trigger—which we surely can—then we 
would obviously end up with a contradiction. That means that 
backwards causation is impossible, just as I’ve said all along.
Carlene: Are you as confident about your predictions about this 
trial as you were about the last one?
Willie: Hey, we might all be surprised by the results. Tad, you 
ready?
Tad: Always.
The three gather intently. (See Figure 4.2)
Fig. 4.2 The Really Weird Results
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Tad [studying the monitor]: Well, I’m glad that we ran this trial, but 
as I expected it looks as though the time-travel hypothesis is shot. 
If the second particle really was the original particle traveling 
backwards in time as a result of the trigger, then it shouldn’t 
have appeared. Now we have the anomalous particle appearing 
without the trigger. It lives its short life and decays just in time 
for the psi-lepton to rush past it. It looks like we’re back to the 
drawing board.
Carlene: Well, that’s assuming the program ran as intended. 
Willie?
Willie: I’m almost positive that it worked. Based on the previous 
trial, the computer obviously can turn the trigger on or off in the 
interval of only a couple nanoseconds. Let me check. Yeah, the 
diagnostic log shows that the trigger was turned off after the 
appearance of the second particle.
Willie thinks to himself while Tad and Dr. Rufus quietly discuss 
the results.
Carlene: What do you think, Willie?
Willie: I have to admit that the possibility that the trigger 
caused the psi-lepton to travel backwards in time is now looking 
doubtful; there was no trigger-event, but there’s still the path of 
what we thought was the time-traveling psi-lepton. Everything 
we’ve seen before suggests that this anomalous particle shouldn’t 
have appeared, but it did, this time with a seemingly completely 
normal psi-lepton also in the chamber.
Carlene: If the trigger wasn’t causing the second particle, then 
why didn’t it appear in Trial 18, or any of our earlier trials, when 
the trigger was never in place? Why now? For that matter, when 
there were the two particles, why did they both disappear? It 
never really looked like a collision or annihilation. But look here 
at the data tables: now we are seeing a slight disturbance in the 
magnetic field at both t=5 and t=7 nanoseconds, but there’s no 
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collision since the normal particle continues along its expected 
trajectory. We have the second particle, no collision, and the 
normal particle living its full life.
Willie: Do you think that time travel might still be involved?
Carlene: Well, I have to agree with Tad that the time-travel 
hypothesis isn’t looking so good at the moment. This was only 
one trial, though; there’s more work to do. Who knows? Let’s 
wrap this up for now. I’ll see you fellows tomorrow.
5. Friday
It is 9:00 am. Tad enters the lab where Dr. Rufus and Willie are 
already halfway through their cups of coffee. Tad smiles smugly 
as he makes his way to the coffee pot.
Carlene: What’s got you so chipper this morning?
Willie: Do you mind, Tad? It’s far too early for that.
Tad: Okay, so I’ve been doing a little research, and I spent last 
night brainstorming about our tricky little test subject, especially 
the result from yesterday.
Carlene [listening carefully]: Please continue.
Tad: I still think that one-dimensional time travel is impossible. 
How can someone go back into the past and change it when that 
would change the future? So on and so forth. It would create 
direct contradictions.
Willie [shaking his head]: Well, no, Tad, because, even if someone 
were to travel to the past, the past would have already occurred 
the way it did; it would have included the arrival of the time 
traveler and his or her actions.
Carlene: Do we really need to debate the grandfather paradox 
again?
Tad: Bear with me a minute. I finally found an answer that makes 
sense to me. Willie, do you remember on Monday when you 
mentioned the possibility that time isn’t one-dimensional? The 
way around the paradox is to drop the idea that time has only 
one dimension!
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0043.05
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Willie: Tad, I meant only to suggest that we can’t even begin to 
make sense of films like Back to the Future without supposing that 
time is multi-dimensional. I meant to introduce to the discussion 
the possibility that time permits more than one timeline or branch 
of a timeline, but I never meant to suggest that time might actually 
be multi-dimensional. What are you trying to get at?
Tad: What if on one timeline my grandfather lives a normal life? 
He dies of old age, and then I decide to go back in time. My arrival 
is on a closely related timeline, but not the original timeline. And 
there you have it! I can kill my grandfather. The murder would 
have no effect on my birth because my birth isn’t on this new 
timeline; my birth is only on the original timeline.
Willie: Yeah, I get the idea. It’s a fun idea, Tad, really. But as 
far as the grandfather paradox is concerned—and as far as I’m 
concerned—your multiple timelines are gratuitous metaphysical 
musings.
Tad: Look, all week I’ve been searching the internet for 
information on time travel, and last night I came across this site, 
timetravelphilosophy.net, which a professor and his students 
assembled. It’s got some really good stuff; it even puts forth 
some models of multi-dimensional time and discusses how the 
past could be changed. I can tell you where the particle is coming 
from!
Carlene: You have my attention.
Tad: The website got me thinking: what if I decide to travel back 
to Willie’s tenth birthday party?
Willie: That would be awesome. The time travel, I mean, not you 
at my party; my parents and I would have been more than a little 
creeped out to have this unfamiliar graduate student crashing my 
party.
Tad: Hey, it would be a blast; I even know how to juggle! 
Anyway, if I decided to travel back to your tenth birthday party, I 
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wouldn’t be traveling back to an event exactly like you remember, 
Willie; I’d be traveling to the party along a different dimension. 
The party I would visit would include my arrival. The original 
timeline—the one we’re on right now—would branch as I arrived, 
with the original timeline going the way you remember it did, 
and another branch including my arrival. As one timeline plays 
out, I didn’t arrive at the party; as the other plays out,  I did. On 
this model, a time traveler to the past is bound to change the past.
Carlene: Does this model really let the time traveler alter the 
past, though? It sounds like you would arrive at a very similar 
but distinct party, not the party of Willie’s past.
Tad: I’m not sure that matters very much to our results.
Willie: Probably not, but I’m inclined to think that it could be the 
same party along the two branches. The party along each branch 
stands in causal and spatiotemporal relations to events that are 
identical along parts of the timeline prior to the branching, which 
seems to me to be sufficient for the identity of me with my younger 
self, my parents with their younger selves, and the continued 
existence of the party that started before Tad made his arrival. 
With one-dimensional time travel to the past, one person can be 
at two places at once, so why not one person along the original 
timeline and also along the alternate timeline? There could even 
be one event partially along the original line and partially along 
the branch; for example, this would be the case with the party.
Carlene: I’m having a hard time visualizing this.
Tad [taking out some paper]: Okay, take a look. The t-axis represents 
normal time along the original timeline, and it indexes the normal 
times. A person born at (t0, L0) who never time-travels will live 
her life along the t-axis. Now, the L-axis keeps track of branches 
off the original timeline; L1 will be the first branch. I’ll graph the 
birthday example. Willie, what year were you born?
Willie: I was born in 1970.
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Tad looks surprised. Dr. Rufus smiles briefly.
Tad: Hmm, you’re older than you look. So, let’s have t0 represent 
1970, and we’ll tick off intervals of ten years. I was born in 1990, 
so my birth is here at t2.
Willie [interrupting]: Tad, I didn’t realize you were just a kid.
Tad: Come off it, Willie! Try to focus. So, if I decide in 2010 to 
depart in my time machine set to travel back 30 years, to your 
tenth birthday in 1980, my departure would be from (t4, L0), a 
point along the original branch; I would cross back and arrive at 
(t1, L1), which is 1980 on the arrival line. If I stay along that timeline 
for 40 years, I’ll be about 60 at (t5, L1). Here, I’ve highlighted my 
life on the graph. (See Figure 5.1)
Fig. 5.1 The Life of Tad1
1  To see an animation of any of the Friday illustrations online  
visit www.openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783740376#resources  
or scan the QR code.
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Carlene: So (t5, L1) would correspond to 2020 along the arrival 
branch rather than the departure branch. You would lead your 
life, missing 2015 along the departure branch but being a part of 
it along the arrival branch.
Tad [smiling]: ‘Departure branch’, that’s good. Don’t you think this 
is really shaping up?
Carlene: Why did you say you’d be about 60 in 2020 on the arrival 
branch, rather than exactly 60?
Tad: Well, you’ve got to consider whatever amount of time I 
experience during the trip, here along the diagonal.
Carlene: Tell me a little more about this diagonal part of the trip.
Tad: Well, there are a couple of ways time travel could go: you could 
either skip over all the time between the departure and the arrival, or 
move through all the time between the departure and the arrival.
Willie: Right, that’s the difference between discontinuous and 
continuous time travel. On a discontinuous trip, the time traveler 
leaves one time and instantaneously appears in another, without 
the traveler experiencing any time between the departure and 
arrival; this is the way things appear to go in Back to the Future when 
the DeLorean gets up to speed. On a continuous trip, however, the 
time traveler leaves one time and has to travel through the time 
and space between the departure and the arrival, to the effect 
that, as Tad suggested, time passes for the traveler between the 
departure and the arrival; the time machine in H.G. Wells’ The 
Time Machine travels in this way. Time travel in The Time Machine is 
one-dimensional, and we’ve clarified that time travel in Back to the 
Future only begins to make sense if it’s multi-dimensional. So far, 
that’s the Wellsian time machine’s one-dimensional continuous 
travel and the DeLorean’s multi-dimensional discontinuous travel, 
but what you seem to be describing, Tad, is multi-dimensional 
continuous time travel.
Tad: Right, like the boxes in Primer.
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Willie: Oh, so you’ve seen it?
Tad: Yeah, the website on time travel suggested it; I watched it 
last night.
Willie: It’s a good one. Tell Dr. Rufus about it.
Carlene: Oh my.
Tad: Primer is a movie about two engineers, Aaron and Abe, who 
discover a way to travel backwards in time. They build boxes out 
of PVC pipe and who-knows-what; they turn these boxes on, and 
then later they can get inside and travel back to the time when 
the boxes were turned on. The catch is that they have to wait 
inside the boxes while they travel through all the time between 
getting in and getting out. As Willie said, the movie depicts 
multi-dimensional time, so they can change the past; they make 
big bucks buying stocks that they know will do well at the end of 
the day, and all kinds of other stuff.
Carlene: So, figuratively speaking of course, you think that the 
psi-lepton is traveling in a Primer box?
Tad: You’ve got it, Professor.
Willie: This makes a certain amount of sense, but I’m not sure 
why they don’t end up along L2 or even L1/2 for that matter.
Tad: I put the arrival branch along L1 because I’m thinking of it 
as the branch on which the traveler stops traveling—and begins, 
once again, to experience the ordinary passage of time—after her 
first trip. If she left that branch, she would end up on L2, and 
so on. When exactly along the arrival branch the traveler arrives 
depends on the settings of the time machine: 30 years back, 80 
years back, or 80 years forward. Make sense? 
Carlene: Do all time travelers departing from L0 arrive on L1? 
What if they set their time machines to arrive at different times 
in the past?
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Tad: Let’s keep it simple: at most one time-travel departure for 
each line or branch and exactly one time-travel arrival for each 
branch. For every departure of a time traveler, there will be an 
arrival and this arrival is the beginning of the new branch off 
the departure line or branch. 
Carlene: What about the times along L1 prior to your arrival at t1? 
What events take place then?
Tad: As Willie hinted earlier, the events on L1 before t1 would be the 
same events that happened before t1 on L0; in general, the events 
before the arrival time on the arrival branch are the same events 
that happened before that time on the departure branch. On the 
graph, L1 looks separated from L0 both after and before the arrival 
time, but that’s just a flaw of the visual representation. I intend for 
the events along L0 prior to t1 to be the causal and spatiotemporal 
antecedents of the t1 and post-t1 events along both L0 and L1.
Carlene: Okay, Tad, you’re right; this really is starting to shape 
up. But what does it mean for our research? Are you saying that 
every time the trigger happens, the psi-lepton travels to a different 
timeline? What observations might we expect with your hypothesis 
that time is multi-dimensional?
Tad: Well, that depends on which branch we’re on. Are we on the 
branch where I show up at Willie’s tenth birthday party or the 
one where I don’t show up? Here’s what I think: every trigger 
occurrence represents a departure of the psi-lepton. With multi-
dimensional time travel, there are many more possible outcomes 
than with one-dimensional time travel. In multi-dimensional time 
travel, depending on which branch you’re on, you’re going to see 
completely different things on the printout.
Willie: It’s like what I said my parents would observe at my tenth 
birthday party: along the departure branch there’s nothing unusual, 
but along the arrival branch there’s a creepy graduate student.
Tad: I’m glad you understand the model, Willie.
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Carlene: How about our observations? What’s going on with the 
psi-lepton?
Tad: This is going to get tricky in a minute, but we can start off 
simply enough. If we’re considering the psi-lepton as the time 
traveler on the departure line, let’s make t0 be zero nanoseconds 
and tick off intervals of one nanosecond; so t5 is at five nanoseconds 
where the trigger occurs, if it occurs at all. Now, let’s consider 
something like Trial 16, where the trigger doesn’t occur. Here’s 
what the graph would look like. (See Figure 5.2)
Fig. 5.2 An Ordinary Psi-Lepton: No Time Travel
Willie: No trigger, just normal psi-lepton behavior, living for 
seven nanoseconds and decaying at t7 on the graph.
Tad: Right, but that’s only the most straightforward case. Next 
we need to consider what the graph looks like when the trigger 
occurs at t5. Keep in mind that we’re making these observations 
from L0. Also, remember we’re working on the supposition that 
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the trigger causes the psi-lepton to depart on a trip that’s a case 
of inter-timeline time travel.
Willie [interrupting]: 88 miles per hour! It would look to us like 
the psi-lepton just vanishes, just like the DeLorean when it gets 
up to speed. The graph would show the psi-lepton existing only 
from t0 to t5. Why don’t you draw that? (See Figure 5.3)
Fig. 5.3 A Time-Traveling Psi-Lepton as seen from the Departure Branch?
Tad: Calm down, Willie. And remember we’re using the Primer-
box metaphor, not the DeLorean. Think of it as Abe getting into 
the box. But you’re right because, as far as we could tell, the 
particle’s life would just end at five nanoseconds.
Willie: We haven’t seen a trial with this behavior, have we?
Tad: Well, you haven’t, but Dr. Rufus and I have.
Carlene: Have we?
Tad: Yes, Trial 12.
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Willie: Trial 12? You haven’t mentioned that one; I assumed 
it was one of the early successes, a single particle that behaved 
according to your theory.
Carlene: Of course, Trial 12! Willie, it was the beginning of our 
unexpected results. I had already dismissed it; we thought it was 
just a mishap of some kind since the results were never duplicated.
Tad: A mishap of some kind, but not exactly in the way we 
thought then. Here, Willie, take a look. (See Figure 5.4)
Fig. 5.4 The Disregarded Results
Willie: Are you sure the trigger occurred? It doesn’t appear to 
have occurred because there’s no second particle.
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Tad [pulling out the data tables]: As you can see here, there was a 
B-field disturbance at t=5.
Carlene: I remember now how strange I thought that was; it 
couldn’t have been due to decay because the particle hadn’t lived 
nearly long enough.
Willie: What does the disturbance have to do with anything?
Tad [trying to contain excitement]: Okay, let me explain what my 
theory says. First of all, the trigger is causing the psi-lepton to 
time-travel.
Willie: We’ve always had that as part of the hypothesis.
Tad: Give me a second, Willie. The occurrence of the trigger causes 
the psi-lepton to travel backwards across timelines. Remember that 
each step into the past changes the past. Traveling across timelines 
surely takes some energy, which has to come from somewhere, so 
the trigger draws it from the B field in the chamber; that’s where 
the disturbance is coming from. During Trial 12, we observed a psi-
lepton hit the trigger at t=5, at which point it got some energy from 
the B field, and it left our timeline. Always, the first question we 
need to consider is whether we’re on the departure or the arrival 
branch. Here we’re on the departure branch.
Carlene: So, an equally important question is whether the trigger 
is on or off on our branch.
Willie: That’s nice, Tad, but what about Trial 15? There are two 
particles, and there was no magnetic field disturbance. What 
about that?
Tad: There are a lot of different factors to consider. Depending 
on which branch we’re on and—you’re right, Professor—whether 
the trigger is on or off, there’s a variety of possible outcomes. The 
behavior exhibited during Trial 15 is one such outcome. Let’s 
take a look. (See Figure 5.5)
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Fig. 5.5 A Time-Traveling Psi-Lepton as seen from the Arrival Branch?
Willie: I hope you’ve got something good.
Tad: Just hear me out. On our timeline the trigger is on; the psi-
lepton travels normally until t=5, at which point it hits the trigger 
and leaves our timeline. Meanwhile, at t=3 there appears a psi-
lepton from another timeline; on that timeline the trigger must have 
been on, too. Based on our previous time-travel hypothesis, the 
second path was the same psi-lepton traveling backwards in time; 
on my hypothesis, it’s a psi-lepton from a different timeline, and it’s 
traveling forward in time. It arrives at t=3 and moves towards the 
psi-lepton that originated on our timeline. Good so far?
Willie: So far, so good, I guess.
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Tad: Now, you asked why there was no B-field disturbance during 
this trial. It’s because the psi-lepton that arrived on our timeline 
decays! It lives the first five nanoseconds of its life on its timeline—
its departure branch—and it lives the last two nanoseconds of its life 
on our timeline—its arrival branch—at which point it decays, here 
at t=5. The energy released from this decay supplies the energy for 
our psi-lepton to depart; it doesn’t need to get it from the B field!
Dr. Rufus’s eyes widen. Willie looks excited but nervous.
Willie: Remember when we were talking about your time-travel 
trip to my tenth birthday party? You said that after staying on the 
arrival branch for 40 years you would be about 60 years old. The 
psi-lepton has an extremely short lifespan. How is it living for five 
nanoseconds on its original timeline and two nanoseconds on our 
timeline when it must have spent some of its life during the diagonal 
trip across timelines?
Tad: I’m way ahead of you. We don’t know what might be going on 
during an inter-timeline trip, but I think it’s safe to assume that the 
physics is a nightmare. Now, the predicted lifetime of the psi-lepton 
is really a mean lifetime; it may live just a little bit less or a little bit 
more than seven nanoseconds. So, if the psi-lepton experiences less 
than two nanoseconds during its trip—and, for all we know, this is a 
possibility—then it’s possible for it to live another two nanoseconds 
after it arrives.
Carlene: This is clever, Tad, but I have one more question: if the 
psi-lepton that arrives on our timeline at t=3 nanoseconds is moving 
forward in time, why is it moving towards the lower part of the 
chamber, towards our psi-lepton? The path made sense when it was 
the same psi-lepton moving backwards in time—from its perspective 
it never changed direction in space—but I’m not sure about this.
Tad: That troubled me for a while last night, which is when I decided 
to take a break to watch Primer. I know this is kind of lame, but what 
if the psi-lepton has to turn around to get out of its Primer box to stop 
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time-traveling? What I mean is this: what if every time the particle 
stops time-traveling, its direction in space is reversed?
Carlene: It’s a stretch, Tad, but it makes enough sense to me, at least 
for now. What do you think, Willie?
Willie: I don’t know. On one hand, it makes some sense of the 
data, like you said. On the other hand, why introduce so much 
tedium? Trial 12 aside, we had a pretty good and simple hypothesis 
about what we’d observed. Unless your theory can explain Trial 
20 from yesterday, I don’t see why we need it.
Tad: That’s the thing, Willie; it does explain Trial 20! It explains every 
trial!
Willie: Okay, so show us. Here’s the printout. (See Figure 5.6)
Fig. 5.6 Trigger-On Departure, Trigger-Off Arrival, 
 as seen from the Arrival Branch?
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Tad: After all I’ve just explained, it’s a piece of cake. Remember 
that the program we were using during Trial 20 was set to turn 
the trigger off just in case a second psi-lepton was detected, and 
that the trigger was initially on. So, our psi-lepton is traveling 
along, and at t=3, the second psi-lepton appears from another 
timeline, which turns the trigger off. The second psi-lepton 
decays at t=5, and our psi-lepton—since there’s no trigger 
anymore, remember—keeps moving until it decays as expected 
after about seven nanoseconds. The most important thing to 
notice here is that on the second psi-lepton’s departure branch, 
the trigger never got turned off; otherwise it wouldn’t have 
traveled to our timeline. The set-up on that departure branch 
would have had to be the same as ours—the same program 
running and all—but this is fine; all that means is that on the 
departure branch no second psi-lepton showed up to turn the 
trigger off.
Carlene: What about the magnetic field disturbances we 
recorded yesterday?
Tad: That’s easy. Since our timeline isn’t a departure branch, 
when the psi-leptons decayed, they didn’t have anything to feed 
their decay energy. The decay of the particle that arrived on our 
timeline at t=3 should have disturbed the B field at t=5, and it 
did. Our original psi-lepton—the one we created at t=0 on this 
timeline—should have decayed and disturbed the B field at t=7, 
and it did. Both disturbances are here.
Willie stares blankly for a moment before smiling.
Willie: So, on the departure and arrival branches of Trials 
15, 17, and 19, the trigger was on, and we were on the arrival 
branch. But during Trials 16 and 18, the trigger was off, so there 
was no departure or arrival. During Trial 12, we were on the 
departure branch, which had the trigger on. And during Trial 
20, we were on the arrival branch with the trigger off, but the 
departure branch had the trigger on. Damn, Tad, as crazy as it 
all seems, I’m impressed. I never really doubted the possibility 
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of multi-dimensional time, but I never saw why it might be 
needed; it seemed ontologically irresponsible to assume it 
about our universe. I never thought there could be empirical 
evidence that spoke in favor of multi-dimensional time over 
one-dimensional time, but it looks like you found some. These 
models have to be taken more seriously than I ever thought. 
If we grant that the psi-lepton is time-traveling, our evidence 
favors it time-traveling multi-dimensionally rather than 
one-dimensionally.
Tad [smiling]: Thanks, Willie. But yeah, our recent trials are 
all evidence of time travel. The trigger always sends the psi-
leptons back in time, and we’re here sometimes to collect them 
and sometimes to watch them go.
Willie: I’ve got to take my hat off to you, Tad; you’re now 
reasoning like Dr. Rufus was on Monday, looking for 
explanations that would make sense of the data. And I guess 
you have my hopes up a little that we’re really witnessing time 
travel. I never liked multi-dimensional time; I never saw the 
point.
Tad: Is it too soon for me to buy a rifle and take after Gramps, 
or better yet Hitler? Too soon to check out the mid-cap stocks 
and make my fortune? Too soon to take a trip to the past in 
order to step around any blades of grass I well please?
Carlene: Hold your horses, Tad. As incredible as all this seems, 
no one’s time-traveling or even leaving this room until we get 
more results; we only have one example each of trials like 12 
and 20. Are there any additional experiments we need to run?
Willie: Yeah, getting more results like Trials 12 and 20 would 
be great. But I want to look into something I just thought of. Tad, 
where’s the printout for Trial 19? Ah, here it is. (See Figure 5.7)
Tad: What about it? The results are the same as Trial 15 and the 
others.
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Fig. 5.7 A Challenge for Tad’s Multi-Dimensional Hypothesis
Willie: The results were the same, but the experimental set-up was 
unique. We started Trial 19 with the trigger off, but the program 
was designed to turn the trigger on if it detected two particles in the 
chamber. Supposing time is one-dimensional, my explanation for 
the results was that this was one of two perfectly possible results, 
neither of which was determined by the conditions prior to three 
nanoseconds. The results were explained by a causal loop; the 
time-traveling psi-lepton in the upper part of the chamber was 
detected, which turned on the trigger, which sent the psi-lepton 
in the lower part of the chamber back to t=3 when it was detected.
Tad: Yeah, but that makes no sense to me. I don’t believe in the 
possibility of causal loops just like I don’t believe in the possibility 
of time-traveling to the past without changing it.
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Carlene: Oh, Tad, but that’s the issue, isn’t it? If there was no 
causal loop, what’s your explanation of the results of Trial 19?
Tad: That’s the beauty of my theory; I don’t need a causal loop. 
The results of Trial 19 are consistent with the trigger occurring on 
the arrival and departure branches.
Willie: Be careful. The experimental set-up couldn’t have been 
different on the departure and arrival branches; you said so 
yourself when you were talking about Trial 20. For Trial 19, the 
set-up was such that the trigger doesn’t occur on the departure 
branch unless there are two particles in the chamber before three 
nanoseconds; the trigger was programmed to turn on if and only if 
the second particle was detected. Your model doesn’t allow intra-
timeline time travel, so how does the departure branch get the 
trigger turned on? It seems that a causal loop in one-dimensional 
time is the only way to make sense of the results. You realized 
yesterday that on your view the psi-lepton shouldn’t have time-
traveled during Trial 19. Unfortunately, it looks like it did.
Tad: Maybe we just can’t explain these results. Maybe the second 
particle spontaneously appeared, and spontaneously decayed 
before it should have, and, hey, it’s no worse than the causal loop, 
which you said might be inexplicable!
Willie: I suggested that the causal loop itself might be inexplicable, 
but the loop does allow for the results we got.
Tad [grabbing at the air]: Well, what if there was an infinite 
regression of branches, each one receiving a particle that turns its 
trigger on so that it can send its particle to the next branch
Willie: What about those branches, then? Are we on each one to 
infinity and beyond? One of the virtues of your model was that 
it allowed you to make predictions that could be observationally 
confirmed, but an infinite regression of branches? How do we 
confirm that? This is an ad hoc addendum to your hypothesis, 
Tad, and to be honest I felt similarly about your idea that the 
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psi-lepton turns around in space after time-traveling. The rest 
was great, though; I’m sorry it doesn’t work out.
Tad: I’m not sure what to say, Willie. I can’t make sense of Trial 
19, but you can’t explain Trials 12 or 20.
Willie: We need more results. Carlene, what do you want to do 
next? Do you want the trigger to turn on only when there are two 
particles? I could also leave it to turn off only when there are two 
particles. We have a fair amount of choice.
Carlene: Both Trials 19 and 20 raise interesting issues, and 
we’ve run those experiments only once each. Let’s just leave the 
program from Trial 20 running for now. Maybe we’ll get results 
like Trial 12; that would help out Tad’s hypothesis.
Tad: I’d love anything in my favor. You ready, Willie?
Willie: Yeah, I’m all set. Don’t get your hopes up for a repeat of 
Trial 12, though.
Tad: What do you think the chances are?
Carlene: We’re scientists. This is Jefferson National Laboratory.
Tad: Meaning?
Carlene: We wait and see.

Notes
The Introduction makes reference to two nicely accessible intro-
ductions to the physics of time travel: J. Richard Gott’s Time Travel 
in Einstein’s Universe (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 2001) and Paul 
Davies’ How to Build a Time Machine (New York: Penguin, 2001). 
The philosophical work appealed to is David Hume’s Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).
Monday identifies issues raised in popular time-travel movies, 
touching briefly on the infamous grandfather paradox. The movies 
mentioned are Back to the Future, dir. Robert Zemeckis (Universal, 
1985) and The Terminator, dir. James Cameron (Orion, 1984).
Tuesday builds on David Lewis’s ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976), 145-52, to address the 
grandfather paradox and other bilking arguments. Similar issues 
are addressed in Paul Horwich’s, ‘On Some Alleged Paradoxes 
of Time Travel’, Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 432-44; Kadri 
Vihvelin’s, ‘What Time Travelers Cannot Do’, Philosophical Studies, 
81 (1996), 315-30; and Jenann Ismeal’s ‘Closed Causal Loops and 
the Bilking Argument’, Synthese, 136 (2003), 305-20. The movie 
discussed is 12 Monkeys, dir. Terry Gilliam (Universal, 1995).
Wednesday focuses on presentism as the source of an objection 
to the possibility of time travel. The conversation includes many 
ideas from Simon Keller and Michael Nelson’s ‘Presentists 
Should Believe in Time-Travel’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
79 (2000), 333-45, and also Phil Dowe’s ‘The Case for Time Travel’, 
Philosophy, 75 (2005), 441-51. Ted Sider’s Four Dimensionalism 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) includes an accessible 
presentation of the philosophical and scientific challenges to 
presentism; see pp. 11-52. Movie discussed: Star Trek IV: The 
Voyage Home, dir. Leonard Nimoy (Paramount, 1986).
Thursday delves into puzzling questions surrounding causal 
loops and their explanations. The example of a jinni (the watch) 
was drawn from the movie: Somewhere in Time, dir. Jeannot Szwarc 
(Universal, 1980). A discussion of these mysterious objects can 
be found in Gott’s Time-Travel in Einstein’s Universe (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2001), pp. 20-24. Two short, delightful papers 
on this topic are Storrs McCall’s ‘An Insoluble Problem’, Analysis, 
70 (2010), 647-48, and Ulrich Meyer’s ‘Explaining Causal Loops’, 
Analysis, 72 (2012), 259-64.
Friday raises the possibility that time is multi-dimensional, the 
idea that events take place along multiple timelines. For more 
fully developed models than the one sketched by Tad, see Peter 
van Inwagen’s ‘Changing the Past’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 
5 (2010), 3-28; G.C. Goddu’s ‘Time Travel and Changing the 
Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale)’, Ratio, 
16 (2003), 16-32; and Jack Meiland’s ‘A Two-Dimensional Passage 
Model of Time for Time Travel’, Philosophical Studies, 26 (1974), 
153-73. The book discussed is H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine (New 
York: Tom Doherty Associates, 1992, first published in 1895). The 
movie discussed is Primer, dir. Shane Curruth (ThinkFilm, 2004). 
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A Time Travel Dialogue
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Is ti me travel just a confusing plot device deployed by science fi cti on authors and 
Hollywood fi lmmakers to amaze and amuse? Or might empirical data prompt a 
scienti fi c hypothesis of ti me travel? Structured on a fascinati ng dialogue involving a 
disti nguished physicist, Dr. Rufus, a physics graduate student and a computer scienti st 
this book probes an experimentally supported hypothesis of backwards ti me travel – 
and in so doing addresses key metaphysical issues, such as causati on, identi ty over ti me 
and free will. 
The setti  ng is the Jeff erson Nati onal Laboratory during a period of fi ve days in 2010. 
Dr. Rufus’s experimental search for the psi-lepton and the resulti ng intractable data 
spurs the discussion on ti me travel. She and her two colleagues are pushed by their 
observati ons to address the grandfather paradox and other puzzles about backwards 
causati on, with att enti on also given to causal loops, multi -dimensional ti me, and the 
prospect that only the present exists. Sensible soluti ons to the main puzzles emerge, 
ulti mately advancing the case for ti me travel really being possible.
A Time Travel Dialogue addresses the possibility of ti me travel, approaching familiar 
paradoxes in a rigorous, engaging, and fun manner. It follows in the long philosophical 
traditi on of using dialogue to present philosophical ideas and arguments, but is ground 
breaking in its use of the dialogue format to introduce readers to the metaphysics of 
ti me travel, and is also disti ncti ve in its use of lab results to drive philosophical analysis. 
The discussion of data that might decide whether ti me is one-dimensional (one 
ti meline) or multi -dimensional (branching ti me) is especially novel.
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